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I. INTRODUCTION

Karl Llewellyn launched his 1930s manifesto Some Realism About
Realism' with a curiously mixed metaphor:
Ferment is abroad in the law....
The ferment is proper to the time. The law of schools threatened at the
close of the century to turn into words-placid, clear-seeming, lifeless, like
some old canal. Practice rolled on, muddy, turbulent, vigorous. It is now
spilling,2 flooding, into the canal of stagnant words. It brings ferment and
trouble.

The muddy yeast was American legal realism, with its rejection of
legal formalism and its embrace of what was to become modem
instrumentalist policy analysis. In contract law, realists are credited the
development of an impressive array of common law rules protecting
reliance, chief among which is the doctrine of promissory estoppel set
forth in section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.' But the
1.

Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,

44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1930-1931).

2. Id. at 1222. Such nostalgiede la boue was apparently common in Depression
era legal scholarship. L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 461
(1934) ("Life resists our attempts to subject it to rules; the muddy flow of Being sweeps
contemptuously over the barriers of our Ought."). It reemerged fifty years later. Carol
M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 578 (1988)
(contrasting crystalline bright line rules with muddy standards in property law).
"Ferment" was also a favorite Llewellynian trope connoting spontaneous progress. K.N.
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, andSociety: 11, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341, 379 (1937)
(stating that courts must give "direction to the fermentation" created by the problem of
the standing business relation).
3. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 74, 88-90 (1974);
see Robert A. Hillman, "Instinct with an Obligation" and the "Normative Ambiguity of
Rhetorical Power," 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 775, 781 (1995) (stating that reliance protection is
antiformalist).
The Restatement tempers formalism with reliance protection in several places.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 89(c), 90 (1981) (overcoming the formalism
of the doctrine of consideration); § 45 (unilateral contract) and § 87(2) (offertory
estoppel) (overcoming the formalism of the rules of offer and acceptance); § 88(c)
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realist wave in contract law is said to have crested. For several years,

legal trendspotters have marked a retreat from realist jurisprudence in
the law of contract. Variously termed the "new formalism,"' the "new

conceptualism," 5 the "new conservatism,"6 or "anti-antiformalism,"7 the

trend is seen as a rejection of realist, context-sensitive standards of

adjudication in favor of formalist rules implemented by a mechanical
(guaranty estoppel), § 129 (specific performance after reliance on oral land contract), §
139 (reliance on contracts within the statute of frauds), and § 150 (reliance on oral
modification) (overcoming the formalism of the statute of frauds). A host of other
formalistic rules are conditioned or limited by references to reliance or a party's material
change of position. E.g., id. § 34(3) (stating that an action in reliance on an agreement
whose terms are uncertain may make a remedy appropriate). Reliance is protected
through the Restatement's reference to the inducing of action or forbearance. Id. § 94(c)
(reliance on a stipulation); § 273 (manifesting assent to discharge of contract induces
action or forbearance), § 332(4) (revocability of gratuitous assignment). Reliance is
protected by name in § 84(2)(b) (material change of position on promise to perform
despite non-occurrence of a condition); § 230 (material change of position on occurrence
of condition subsequent); § 256 (retraction of repudiation after material change in
position in reliance); § 323(2) (reliance on obligor's assent to assignment or obligee's
assent to delegation). Reliance is protected, though not by name, in §§ 341(2) and
342(b). See also id § 247 (stating effect of acceptance of part performance creating
belief that a condition will be waived).
4. Ian Ayres, Eroding Entitlements as Litigation Commitment, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
836 (1999); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 781 (1999); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant
Court: Rethinking the Code's Searchfor Inunanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L REV.
1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable
EmpiricalBasis of Article 2's IncorporationStrategy: A PreliminaryStudy, 66 U. Cm.
L. REv. 710 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, PreliminaryStudy]; David Charny, The New
Formalism in Contract,66 U. CHL L. REv. 842 (1999); Richard A. Epstein, Confitsion
About Custom: DisentanglingInformal Customs from StandardContractualProvisions,
66 U. CH. L. REv. 821 (1999); Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of
Contract,90 Nw. U. L. REv. 254, 254 (1995); Symposiunm: Formalism Revisited, 66 U.
CHI. L. REv. 527,710-859 (1999) (neo-formalism in commercial law).
The "new" formalism has been a topic of conversation for about the last thirty-five
years. GuiMORE, supra note 3, at 102--03; ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF
CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CoN'TrPORARY THEORIES OF
CONTRACT LAW 160-71 (1997) [hereinafter HILLMtAN, THE RICHNESS OF CO.N'TACT
LAW]; Robert A. Hiliman, The Triumph of Gilmore'sThe Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U.
L. REV. 32, 42 (1995). Hillman identifies such diverse "no-formalists" in contract law
as himself, Louis Kaplow, Richard Epstein, Mary Becker, and Arthur Leff, in works
dating back to 1967. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW, at 125-28.
5. Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L
REV. 1131, 1133 (1995).
6. Robert A. Hillman, The "New Conservatism" in Contract Law and the
Process of Legal Change,40 B.C. L. REV. 879, 879-80 (1999).
7. Charny, supranote 4, at 842 (explaining that anti-antiformalism seeks to refute
the claim that commercial law should be founded in immanent commercial practice and
to refuse legal enforcement of commercial customs).

jurisprudence. Critics associate the doctrinal shift with a corresponding

rejection of "interventionist, egalitarian" policy in favor of laissez faire
faith in unregulated market exchange.8

Analysts have sought

explanations for the trend in the dynamics of national politics or the laws

of historical oscillations. 9
Most academic criticism has concentrated on neoformalist rules about
the content of contractual obligation in the application of such doctrines
as the parol evidence rule, the obligation of good faith, and the effects of
trade usage. This Article examines the phenomenon as it arises in the
creation of contract obligation, an area in which the virtues of formalism
are arguably more important.'
The developing law of promissory
estoppel does indeed appear to display a trend away from reliance
protection in the commercial world.' Many of these decisions may
fairly be characterized as "formalist" insofar as they privilege textual
forms (written contracts) over other contextual features. This Article
argues, however, that this trend is more accurately characterized as a
realist effort than a formalist or conceptualist one. While the label
applied to the practice may appear to be unimportant, the term
"formalism" tends both to obscure the policy-oriented way in which
courts have manipulated legal doctrine and to minimize the role of
private enterprise in the development of rules that privilege textual
forms. For, as in Llewellyn's era, it has not been the law of schools but
practice that has brought about the change: the practice of well8. Mooney, supra note 5, at 1133. Professor Mooney refers to the judiciary's
receptivity to formalist arguments and its related retrenchment from progressive contract
principles as a "new conceptualism." Id.
Just as Grant Gilmore predicted, the "Easter-tide" of the 1980s and early 90s
resurrected many of the conceptualist abstractions of classical contract law....
[Such] courts have substantially abandoned the interventionist, egalitarian
contract jurisprudence of the 1960s and 70s, substituting a far more classical,
conceptualist ethic emphasizing once again "freedom of contract" and
marketplace economics.
Id. Gilmore seems to have agreed with both the diagnosis and the "new conceptualist"
term. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 107-08 (1977).

9.

See Hillman, supra note 6, at 883-88; discussion, supra note 8.

10. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 4, at 168; ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SocIAL NORMS 156-61 (2000) (suggesting that merchants may deem
courts to be more competent to determine the existence of contractual commitmentfrom the presence or absence of legal formalities-than to determine the precise content
of contract terms or the existence of breach).
11. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in
Commercial PromissoryEstoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 943, 943;
Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An
Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 580, 580 (1998) [hereinafter
Hillman, Questioning]; Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory
Estoppel in the Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2-3 (1999) [hereinafter Hillman,
Unfulfilled Promise].
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counseled merchants and the judges who listened to them."
This Article makes several points about promissory estoppel in the
commercial world: (1) merchants generally seek to avoid reliance-based
liability and to confine their legal obligation to express contracts; (2) to
avoid the risk of section 90 liability, merchants have adopted, and the
courts have validated, a formalist/textual strategy using preemptive
disclaimers to block reliance-based claims; (3) by scrutinizing the
"reasonableness" of the promisee's reliance, modern courts are

increasingly prone to deny commercial parties the benefit of relianceprotecting doctrines in an effort to channel them toward the exclusive
use of formalized contracts; and (4) merchants have begun to procure
statutory barriers to provide additional security against certain types of

section 90 claims. Propelled by the most "realist" of motives, the "new
formalism" promises to erase liability for promissory estoppel from the

commercial landscape.
If.THE MERCHANT FORMALIST COUNTERATrACK ON SECTION 90

The evolution of the law of reliance-based obligation is periodically
hailed as the crowning achievement of twentieth century American

common law.'3 If so, then the doctrine of promissory estoppel is the
jewel in the crown. To some, the official recognition of promissor
estoppel in section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts"
promised an escape from the formal restrictions of the consideration

doctrine then lodged in section 75.S Early decisions anticipated a radical

12. "Contract behavior, not contract doctrine, came first, and contract law
responded, first through judicial decisions and later through codes." Speidel, supra note
4, at 257. "This is a first principle of American Legal Realism:' Id. at n.15.
13. Jay M. Feinman, PromissoryEstoppel and JudicialMethod, 97 HARV. L REV.
678, 678 (1984) ("One of the most significant developments in contract law in the past
half-century has been the rise of promissory estoppel... :');
Hillman, Unfulfilled
Promise, supra note 11, at 2; Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement:
The Proliferationof PromissoryEstoppel, 81 COLUtM L. REv. 52, 53 (1981) (stating that
Section 90's principle has become "perhaps the most radical and expansive development
of this century in the law of promissory liability").
14. RESTATMENT (SECOND) oFCoVrRACTS § 90 (1981).
15. GIliORE, supra note 3, at 72 (stating that by the time of the Restatement
(Second), the principle of section 90 had "swallowed up the bargain principle of § 75').
The bargain principle currently resides in section 71 of the Restatement (Second). See
Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78
YALE L. 343, 353, 355 (1969) (noting inter aliathe frequency with which section 90 is
invoked in commercial cases).

expansion of promissory obligation under the new doctrine. 6 Yet the
litigation history of the last sixty years has witnessed a successful,
counterrevolutionary effort by institutional promisors to avoid liability
for promissory estoppel, 7 so that today only the most legally naive
promisor risks liability under section 90.
Textual formalism and realism each supply elements of the

contemporary judicial blockade of section 90.

As formalists, most

courts insist upon a promise of the correct form and give effect to formal
disclaimers of liability; as realists, they employ normative and
consequentialist reasoning when analyzing reliance, insisting that a
plaintiff exhibit behavior that comports with the court's view of best
commercial practices. Realist policy reasoning seems paramount in the
explicit insistence by some of the "new formalist" courts that
sophisticated commercial parties formalize all their legal obligations and

entitlements.
A. A Fuller Considerationof Form
To describe the "new formalism" requires some clarification of the
several related ideas in jurisprudence that go by the name "formalism."
At a relatively high level of abstraction, formalism refers to an alleged
philosophical view of law as being in its essence autonomous, objective,
complete, coherent, and deductive. 8 As a mode of adjudication,
formalism refers to a judicial tendency to apply existing legal rules
literally, mechanically, and without reference to their purposes or to
public policy.' 9 Neither of these two versions of formalism is the sort
16. DeLong, supra note 11, at 944.
17. Id. at 945; Hillman, Questioning,supra note 11 (reporting low success rates of
plaintiffs in promissory estoppel case reports).
18.

ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY

136-59 (1982); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 608-09
(1999).
To the classical formalists, law meant... a scientific system of rules and
institutions that were complete in that the system made right answers available
in all cases; formal in that right answers could be derived from the
autonomous, logical working out of the system; conceptually ordered in that
ground-level rules could all be derived from a few fundamental principles; and
socially acceptable in that the legal system generated normative allegiance.
Id. To Stanley Fish, formalism implies that "once a question has been posed as a legal
question-has been put into the proper form-the answer to it will be generated by
relations of entailment between that form and other forms in the system." STANLEY
FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too 143

(1994). This Article will not attempt to characterize the vast scholarly literature on the
nature of formalism. Numerous other definitions of formalism can be found in
Symposium, supra note 4. Whether anyone has ever actually subscribed fully to the
more extreme versions of formalism is doubtful.
19. Cass Sunstein describes formalism as a strategy of statutory interpretation as
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referred to as the "new formalism" of contract adjudication; indeed, the

new formalism conflicts with both these ideas.
As an attribute of particular substantive law, and particularly the law

of contract, formalism can also mean "textualism," the tendency to make
legal obligation depend upon express language occurring in specified
circumstances. To a textualist, contract formation and content depend
upon the performance of specific speech acts,' such as "offer,"
"acceptance," and "promise." It is this sense of "formalism" as

textualism that is enjoying a judicial vogue. But textualism is a strategy
rather than a philosophy and as such is equally compatible with what is
usually called "realism."
Antiformalism, or "realism," views law as a matter of purpose and
policy.2 ' As a general view of law, realism is instrumentalism, law
follows:
[Flormalist strategies... entail three commitments: to promoting compliance
with all applicable legal formalities (whether or not they make sense in the
individual case), to ensuring rule-bound law (even if application of the rule,
statutory or contractual, makes little sense in the individual case), and to
constraining the discretion of judges in deciding cases. Thus understood.
formalism is an attempt to make the law both autonomous, in the particular
sense that it does not depend on moral or political values of particular judges.
and also deductive, in the sense that judges decide cases mechanically on the
basis of preexisting law and do not exercise discretion in individual cases.
Formalism therefore entails an interpretive method that relies on the text of the
relevant law and that excludes or minimizes extratextual sources of law. It
tends as well to favor judicial holdings that take the form of wide rules rather
than narrow settlements of particular disputes.
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L REv. 636,
638-39 (1999). See also Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 89 (1995) (stating that the formalist impulse includes a search for certainty, clarity,
consistency, and stability; formalist methods include textualism and originalism).
20. An illocutionary speech act is a conventional action, such as "promising" that
is performed in part by speaking. On speech act theory, see generally The William
James Lectures, in J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson ed.,
1965); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF L,%NGUAGE
(1969).
21. There is no single "opposite" of formalism. Gilmore attributed the antiformalist revolution to "American Legal Realism." GILORE, supra note S. at 74-81.
Summers contrasts formalism with pragmatic instrumentalism. SuiMMERS, supra note 18.
Twining contrasts "formalism" (analytical jurisprudence) with "functionalism"
(sociological jurisprudence). WnILLIAm TWINNG, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIsT
MovmETr 8 (1973). For Judge Posner, antiformalism is "realism," which means
"deciding a case so that its outcome best promotes public welfare in nonlegalistic terms;
it is policy analysis." Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 181
(1986). Mooney emphasizes the political dimension, opposing both formalism and
"conceptualism" to "progressivism." Mooney, supra note 5, at 1131-35. Feinman and

understood as a means to an end instead of an autonomous complex of
norms governed by its own internal logic.' As a mode of adjudication,
realism is a tendency to make legal consequences turn on the court's
view of the social policies relevant to legal enforcement and of the
anticipated effects that different rules will produce. Casting its eye more
broadly than does formalism, realist adjudication introduces more
uncertainties: fewer cases are resolved on summary judgment. In return,
it promises to provide more protection against unintended consequences
and a closer fit between legal purposes and legal effects. Most
importantly, because it focuses on the consequences of enforcement and
the social policies it would serve, realist analysis is more openly
normative than is formalist analysis.
It would appear at first that such realist adjudication would be less
concerned with specific texts and speech acts than is formalist
adjudication. Although the realist judge considers the parties' language
to be relevant, she also looks at a more complete description of their
behavior and is prepared to permit the creation, modification, and
discharge of legal obligation by means other than formal language or
convention. Nevertheless, a realist judge might ultimately decide to
adopt textualism in a particular category of cases if she decided that
textualism would serve policy better than a different rule. Once this
decision has been made, her subsequent opinions may appear to be
purely formalist. This appears to be the case with the "new formalism"
in contract adjudication.
others describe anti-formalism as "instrumentalism, a method in which judges overtly
consider social policy and the social impact of their decisions." Feinman, supra note 13,
at 682 n.21; Steven M. Quevedo, Comment, Formalist and Instrumentalist Legal
Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CAL. L. REv. 119, 119-20 (1985). Cass Sunstein notes:
There is certainly no canonical form of antiformalism, and those who reject
formalism can offer many different competing approaches. But the
antiformalist tends to insist that interpretation requires or permits resort to
sources other than the text, and the antiformalist tends as well to support
judgments that take the form of narrow rather than wide holdings. The
antiformalist is less worried about the exercise of discretion in individual cases
and is more concerned about avoiding the kinds of rigidity that can lead to
injustices and mistakes. Thus the antiformalist might contend that courts
legitimately invoke purposes, or background principles of various kinds, to
push statutes (or contracts) in what seem to be sensible directions. There is
obviously a relationship between the debate over formalism and the debate
over rules and standards ....
Sunstein, supra note 19, at 639.
22. For a fuller description of instrumentalism, see SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 20,
53.
23. In this sense, the orientation of normative law and economics analysis is
"realist," although positive economic analysis of law is an exercise of formalist,
deductive logic. Posner, supra note 21, at 185 ("The modem exemplar of formalism in
common law is the positive economic analysis of that law ... ").
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Formalism and realism are not only competing general theories of law
and judicial strategies. Legal doctrines can also be described as
formalist or realist, depending on how they describe legally operative
facts. In familiar terms, formalist doctrines are "rules" while realist
' For example, a formalist contract rule might
doctrines are "standards."24
make legal liability turn on the existence of a particular illocutionary
speech act, such as a promise, offer, or acceptance," or on the existence

of a relatively concrete fact or event, such as a seal or a signed writing.
A realist contract rule might make liability turn instead on findings of
reasonableness or justice or on a balancing of factors or interests.
Moreover, the texts of legal doctrines or statutes may expressly seek to
prevent or to require courts to pursue formalist or realist modes of

adjudication.6 A "rule" may prohibit a court from considering purpose
or context, as does the parol evidence rule. Conversely, a "standard"

may require a court to consider purpose or context or justice or
reasonableness, as does the doctrine of unconscionability.

Textual formalism thus can serve nonformalist virtues, such as utility
or autonomy. A court's willingness to practice textual formalism
facilitates what theorists have called "power-conferring rules," laws
24. Hillman, supra note 3, at 781; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ.557, 560 (1992). Rules are "an advance determination
of what conduct is permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator." Id.
Rules therefore confine the decisionmaker to a range of preestablished elements. Id. at
589. Standards, on the other hand, "entail leaving both specification of what conduct is
permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator." Id. at 560. See also Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.REV. 1685,
1688 (1976) ("The application of a standard requires the judge both to discover the facts
of a particular situation and to assess them in terms of the purposes or social values
embodied in the standard.").
25. For example, "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the
personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily
accompany and represent a known intent." Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of New York,
200 F. 287,293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
26. See Feinman, supra note 13, at 697. "Under the formal approach epitomized
by the first Restatement, the form of the doctrine and the method of applying it
coalesced; by definition, doctrine stated as rules permitted and required mechanical
application." Id.Feinman notes a change, however, in the Restatement (Second): "The
new style, however, presents a divergence of doctrine and method. Stating a standard is
not equivalent to stating the method by which the standard will be implemented." Id.
27. H.L.A. HART, TBE CONCEPT OF LAw 27-28 (2d ed. 1994) ("Such laws do not
impose duties or obligations. Instead, they provide individuals with facilities for
realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by certain
specified procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures of rights and duties
within the coercive framework of the law."). A legal power has been defined as the

that, by specifying formal prerequisites to legal rights and duties, serve
as sets of directions that parties can follow in order to achieve
predictable legal ends. Fuller and others likened such rules to channels
or canals through which parties can arrive at desired destinations."
Legal forms also serve a closely related cautionary function, which is to
warn a person that he is about to incur legal liability.
Fuller did not emphasize the converse of his channeling insight: legal
forms can channel transactions away from legal consequences if
appropriate forms are made available by the legal system. A typical
utilitarian justification for textual formalism in contract law is the
greater certainty it gives to those legal actors who are aware of the rules
and can use them to structure their business/legal environment. Part of
this assurance is the corresponding certainty that one can avoid legal
liability, not only by avoiding the textual forms essential to obligation, 9
but by using forms that immunize the actor from obligation. The
commercial bar has brought such new forms into existence and the
courts have obliged by validating them in the ensuing cases.
B. The Form of Section 90: The Form of Promise

The new formalism in commercial promissory estoppel adjudication
can be seen in the continuing insistence that the reliance-inducing event

be a "promise" in form, a formal speech act rather than the sum total of
interactions that might convey reassurance to the hearer. Although there

have been a few prominent excetions, most contemporary courts seem
to adhere to a strict formalism,

requiring not only a promise, but a

ability to change a legal relation by bringing about operative facts that are under the
volitional control of human beings. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 44-45 (19131914). See also Kennedy, supra note 24, at 1739 (cataloguing the efficiency arguments
that justify formalist rules); Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
799, 800-03 (1941) (describing the channeling function of legal form).
28. Fuller, supra note 27, at 801-02. For a view that contract law is essentially a
matter of form, see Robert S. Summers, The Formal Character of Law-Criteria of
Validity for Contracts, 9 J. CONT. L. 29, 32 (1995) ("Formal criteria make room for
choice, planning, and self-determination.").
29. POSNER, supra note 10, at 161-63. Stanley Henderson earlier referred to the
rules of contract formation as useful in enabling parties to "express, or to refuse to
express, a willingness to be bound." Henderson, supra note 15, at 357-58, 360.
30. The callousness of some contemporary formalist decisions invokes images of
the Dickensian courts of the nineteenth century. E.g., Hart v. Windjammer Barefoot
Cruises, Ltd., 632 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (App. Div. 1995) (denying plaintiff's claim for
breach of an oral contract involving the exchange of her services for a share of
defendant's corporate stock).
That plaintiff worked 20 years for defendants without any salary and without
even asking what her share of the corporate stock would be or when she would
receive it is not unequivocally referable to the alleged oral contract. Nor do
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clear, distinct, unequivocal promise.3' Language that might be taken as
commitment, even language that would suffice to create bargain contract
liability, will often be insufficient to count as a promise for section 90
purposes.32

That section 90 is applied with this degree of formalism is in some
ways ironic.

If Corbin was indeed concerned about the mechanical

jurisprudence dispensed by formalist courts in the thrall of classical
contract doctrine, then he was forced to use a singularly inapt tool to

remedy the problem. He was obliged to undermine the formalism of
classical contract law with a rule that was itself a form. In the hands of

formalist judges, section 90 became a statute and the word "promise" in
the official expression of the rule of promissory estoppel was given a

literal and precise meaning 3 As a result of this judicial formalism, if a
her allegations that she resigned her position with another company in order to
work for defendants support a claim of promissory estoppel.... [Tihe alleged
agreement to make plaintiff a "part of the Windjammer family" is too vague to
be capable of enforcement...."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
31. Keil v. Glacier Park, Inc., 614 P.2d 502, 506 (Mont. 1980) ("The terms of the
promise must be certain, as there can be no promissory estoppel without a real
promise."). A section 90 claimant must establish an express promise and not merely an
implied one, because promissory estoppel would otherwise be "rendered meaningless:"
C & K Petroleum Prod., Inc. v. Equibank, 839 F.2d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 1988). In the
absence of an express promise, a claim for promissory estoppel cannot be premised on
defendant's words and actions during a course of dealing or performance. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc. v. Robert Levin Carpet Co., No. 98-CV-5884, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7743, at *24-25 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 1999). But see Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Gofen
& Glossberg, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 713,724-25 (N.D. Ill. 1995); First Nat'l Bank of Cicero
v. Sylvester, 554 N.E.2d 1063, 1070 (11. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that although a promise
must be unambiguous in order for it to underlie a claim of promissory estoppel, it need
not be express; it can be inferred from conduct and words). Hillman. Questioning. supra
note 11, at 596; Hillman, Unfuflhled Promise,supra note 11. at 12-15.
32. DeLong, supra note 11, at 1003-07.
33. Opponents of the Restatement project foresaw this formalist risk.
The... [Restatement] is apparently the final answer that the Word alone
counts, and the long and tortuous way by which the Word was ascertained is to
be forgotten.
The process of statutory interpretation, though inevitable, is difficult and
full of pitfalls... [R]estatement interpretation is an unreality.
ROBERT S. SUmMERS & ROBERT A. HI.mAN, CONTRAcT AND RELATED OBLIGATION:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTIcE C-I (3d ed. 1997) (citing Charles E. Clark. The
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643, 652, 654-55 (1933). See also
Feinman, supra note 13, at 709 (stating that courts frequently apply promissory estoppel
in a formalist way as a doctrine, consisting of the language of section 90); Harold C.
Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 ILL L. REv. 910, 914-15
(1932-1933) (stating that the Restatement threatens the case method of analysis); Edwin

potential defendant uttered something short of a clear and distinct
promise, then even if the hearer's reliance was clearly foreseeable (even
if it was invited by the speaker) and even if the reliance occurred as
expected and even if injustice would result in the absence of
enforcement, nevertheless, enforcement would be denied on the sole
ground that a "promise" had not been made. As a consequence, in most
jurisdictions, one need not fear uttering a statement "instinct with an
obligation" so long as it is "imperfectly expressed.""
C. Disclaimers and Other Countertexts
To use Llewellyn's terms, the transformative flood of practice has
been the widespread reaction of the commercial bar to promissory'
estoppel. In light of decisions such as Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.
and Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 6 commercial parties' lawyers realized that
section 90 posed a risk of a new form of liability to their clients, who
were likely to make, or to be accused of making, nonbargain promises
during the course of negotiating formal contracts or during their
performance phases.
For example, employers discuss terms of
employment in prehiring conversations; lenders discuss loans before
making formal loan commitments; franchisors discuss dealerships before
formally signing franchise agreements; commercial lessors or lessees
discuss lease terms before signing a lease; and corporations discuss the
terms of a merger or acquisition before signing a formal agreement.
Recent studies of commercial behavior in various industries have
suggested the reasons for merchants to be reluctant for these preliminary
transactions to create legally enforceable obligations. Lisa Bernstein's
research has shown that most merchants prefer the existence and content
of their legally enforceable obligations to be determined by explicit
textual provisions in written contracts rather than by custom or course of
dealing.37 Bernstein explains these empirical findings by a theory that,
W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts,33 COLUM. L. REv. 397, 399400, 405 (1933) (doubting the ability to choose the single correct meaning of a body of
precedent).
34. Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.). On the
vissitudes of Cardozo's "instinct" rhetoric as it has appeared in the courts, see Hillman,
supra note 3, at 787-94.
35. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
36. 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
37. Bernstein, PreliminaryStudy, supra note 4, at 717-46; Bernstein, Merchant
Law, supra note 4, at 1765. Such merchants also prefer that courts apply formalist
methods rather than realist methods when adjudicating trade disputes.
In deciding cases, the NGFA arbitrators take a formalistic approach to
adjudication; they consistently refuse to look behind the letter of a trade rule to
discern and take into account the type of behavior that the rule is intended to
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for various reasons relating to efficiency, "rational transactors might
deliberately leave aspects of their contracting relationship to be
governed, in whole or in part, by extralegal commitments and
sanctions.""

The same mercantile preference for explicit contract over less formal
sources of legal obligation underlies the marketplace motive for the
counterattack on promissory estoppel liability. Many well-counseled
commercial parties met the threat of section 90 liability through the
surprisingly simple tactic of disclaiming any intention to be legally
bound by their promises.39 Once a disclaimer of the appropriate form
had been made, courts would usually refuse to find the promisor liable
for any ensuing reliance.
To a court applying the formalized doctrine of section 90, a
preemptory disclaimer might be seen to have three related effects, all
tending to preclude enforcement for the promissory estoppel plaintiff:
(1) the disclaimer might prevent the subsequent utterance from being
interpreted as a "promise" because the disclaimer prevents it from being
a commitment; (2) the disclaimer might render the reliance unreasonable
and, therefore, legally unforeseeable; and (3) the disclaimer might make
enforcement unnecessary to prevent injustice because a promisee who
was warned of the promisor's intention not to incur legal liability would
not be "unjustly" denied a remedy he had no right to expect. Each of
these effects is "formal" in that it flows deductively from the "plain
meaning" of the disclaimer's language. Each one will depend upon the
exclusion of any inconsistent features of the transaction or relationship
under consideration for its legal effect.
1. EmbeddedDisclaimers
What happens when, in the act of promising, a promisor says, "I'm not
promising"? In Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.,o an insurance
encourage or discourage.
...The NGFA tribunal does not permit unwritten customs and usages of
trade to vary or qualify the meaning of either trade rules or explicit contractual
provisions.
Id. at 1775, 1777.
38. Id. at 1788.
39. DeLong, supra note 11, at 1007. The phenomenon of disclaiming liability has
been noted by others, e.g., PosN-, supra note 10, at 163; Rose, supra note 2, at 582.
40. 287 P.2d. 735 (Wash. 1955).

company announced to its agents a bonus program under which agents
would receive a year-end bonus calculated by a formula based on the
lapse ratio on policies they sold. The critical parts of the announcement
were these:
Extra Earnings Agreement
Your Home Office folks are well aware... that you in the field must enjoy
a sense of real security and see the road of the future stretching clearly ahead.
Our association must be mutually profitable and pleasant....
Now, in addition to present substantial commissions, we are announcing
your Renewal Bonus Plan which provides extra earnings....
Reserve wants career men-men who are as much concerned about next
year as next month. To attract such workers, and inspire their best efforts, your
Company now puts into effect a schedule of Bonus Payments.
Your Renewal Bonus earnings will depend upon the Quality of your
business as well as the amount. If you do a good job, you will earn a substantial
income. If you do an outstandingjob, you will be very handsomely rewarded.
You will receive at the end of each 12 month period, a bonus in accordance
with the following schedule:
This renewal bonus is a voluntary contribution on the part of the Company.
It is agreed by you and by us that it may be withheld, increased, decreased or
discontinued, individually or collectively, with or without notice....
It will be paid once a year-on the mean amount of your business in
force.... [D]uring the year the boys are separatedfrom the men. The boys
will get no bonus. That Leaves More For The Men.
In return, I ask only that you give me your best efforts....
... [Y]our first Renewal Bonus check will be sent to you as quickly as
humanly possible after the 12 months is up.
If you welcome these Extra Earnings, and I know you will, and to avoid any
possible future misunderstanding, sign the enclosed copy of this agreement and
hand it to your Manager who will send it to me.
"'" C.C. Bradley [signed]41

The underlined disclaimer was unmarked in the original. Its deviant
style and substance are apparent. It is sandwiched between statements
that are unqualified commitments to make the described payments. As
the company hoped, some of its agents (presumably the "Men")
achieved the lapse levels entitling them to bonuses. The company
refused to pay. The agents argued that Reserve's promise to pay
bonuses was enforceable under section 90. Reserve countered that the
disclaimer sentences made its promise illusory. The court agreed that
Reserve had made only a "supposed promise" not a real one.4' Even
though the purpose of the "Extra Earnings Agreement" was to induce the
agents' "best efforts" by giving them "a sense of real security," when
41. Id. at 736-37 (underlined emphasis added).
42. "[B]efore this rule can be applied, there must be a real promise to be enforced.
Action in reliance upon a supposed promise creates no obligation on an individual or
corporation whose only promise is wholly illusory." Id. at 738.
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that reliance ensued, the court felt constrained to deny recovery under
section 90 for lack of a real "promise." The court reluctantly concluded

that the agents were relying on the "corporate conscience" of the
company rather than upon an enforceable contract. The court held

"[tihere is a natural aversion to such one-sided propositions, but we
cannot delete terms or words from an offer, nor can we ignore them, to
make a binding contract for the parties where none exists."'
The apologetic tone is characteristic of some textual formalist courts

who claim to be bound by what they believe is a plain meaning. But the
Spooner court had to do a lot of interpretive work in order to put itself in
that helpless position. In giving controlling force to the disclaimer, the
court ignored several time-honored ways to treat the inconsistency in
Reserve's written announcement: (1) the announcement is ambiguous
and should be construed against the drafter, Reserve, who created the

ambiguity;' (2) the disclaimer should be given a meaning that is
consistent with the express promises, for example, that the power to
withhold the bonus ends after it is earned;, ' (3) the disclaimer should be

deemed to have been superseded by the promises that followed it in the
letter; and (4) the disclaimer should be deemed inoperative as a matter of

lawDespite
because
it accompanied a promise. "4
its protestation that it had no power to "delete terms or words

43. Id.
44. The "proferentum" rule puts the risk of ambiguity on the drafter of the
agreement. E.g., N. Gate Corp. v. Nat'l Food Stores, Inc., 140 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Wis.
1966).
45. The court engaged in such interpretation in the well-known case Tilbert v.
Eagle Lock Co., 165 A. 205 (Conn. 1933). An employer promised its employees death
benefits in an announcement that stated that it "constitutes no contract" and "confers no
legal rights.' Id. at 207. Holding that the benefits promise became enforceable when the
employee died before revocation, the court interpreted the announcement to permit
revocation only prospectively, as to deaths occurring thereafter. Id.
To construe it as meaning, further, that, notwithstanding acceptance by an
employee and compliance therewith, no obligation whatever was imposed
upon the defendant, and that, without exercise of the reserved right of
discontinuance or other action terminating the agreement, it might refuse to
perform it, would ascribe to the defendant an intention to mislead its
employees, to its advantage, by an inducement which was known and intended
by it to be entirely nugatory, and which this record does not require us to
attribute to it.
Id. at 207-08. Accord Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden, 195 N.E. 697, 698-99 (Ohio
1935). Hillman, supra note 3, at 791-92, (discussing 7Tymshar. Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d
1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
46. This is the approach taken by the Sales article of the Uniform Commercial
Code on disclaimers of express warranty. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1962).

from an offer," the court effectively deleted all the promises from the
letter in order to give full force to the disclaimer. Like the grin on the
Cheshire Cat, the disclaimer remained while everything else in the letter
vanished. The decision to reject other ways of dealing with the
contradiction does not flow from the pure form of the letter but from a
tacit, realist view about how commercial messages of this sort should be
dealt with by employers and employees.
2. Preemptive Disclaimers
While the embedded disclaimer works well in calculated inducements
such as Reserve Insurance Company's bonus plan, the potential section
90 defendant requires a more comprehensive protection, a sort of blanket
disavowal that could nullify all other promises, whenever they were
uttered. Creative lawyering has produced such disclaimers in a variety
of precontractual contexts. Appellate reports of the last three decades
contain a luxuriant proliferation of preemptive disclaimers 4 7-letter of
intent disclaimers,4' homemade statutes of frauds, 9 no-oral-modification
clauses, 50 employee handbook disclaimers,5 and notices given to and/or
signed by employees at the time of hiring 5 --all designed to render
legally inoperable any subsequent promise or factual representation.
These disclaimers are often unilateral and noncontractual, as when they
are contained in attorney letters transmitting draft agreements." Yet
such disclaimers are usually given the full effect of contractual promises.
After they are given, the parties can openly promise and make
representations to each other, and the promisee has the risk of reliance.
3. PostpromiseDisclaimers
In several cases, courts have given legal effect to disclaimers or other
inconsistent language uttered after the promise was made. The most
powerful version of a postpromise disclaimer is created by integrating an
47. See also DeLong, supra note 11, at 1007-11.
48. E.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Taco Tico Acquisition Corp., 454 S.E.2d 789, 791
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
49. E.g., Puri v. Blockbuster Music Retail, Inc., No. 95-C-50018, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18819, at *13-14 (N.D. Ili. Dec. 20, 1995); DeLong, supra note 11, at 1009-10.
50. E.g., Arlington Fin. Corp. v. Ben Franklin Bank of Ill., No. 98-C-7068, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1690, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 10, 1999).
51. DeLong, supra note 11, at 1011.
52. Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 709-11 (Wyo. 1996) (stating that
reliance on oral promise that employer would not terminate employee was unreasonable
because employee had signed employee application providing that she was terminable at
will and that no agent of the employer other than the president could make any

agreement to the contrary).
53. See Purl, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18819, at *2,*13-14.
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agreement so as to bar evidence of the earlier promise under the parol
evidence rule. Most courts hold that if the parties have executed a
binding integrated agreement, it discharges any prior promises
inconsistent with the agreement, and if the integration is intended to be a
complete integration, it discharges any prior promises within the subject
matter of the agreement."
But the effect of inconsistent statements is not limited to integrated
agreements. Any inconsistent statement made after a promise is made
can jeopardize the reliance interest. Once a promise has been made, the
postpromise disclaimer can bar liability if reliance has not yet occurred."
D. FormalistInterpretive Rules
The acid test of a disclaimer is whether it will protect the disclaiming
party from liability for a reliance-inducing promise. If a defendant has
made both a disclaimer and a reliance-inducing promise, courts need
some way to interpret the contradictory meaning of these two speechacts. In order to give primacy to the disclaimer and defeat the relying
promisee's claim, neoformalist courts often resort to interpretive
conventions that conflict with the ways that inconsistent statements are
understood in ordinary speech. The choice of these conventions is
additional evidence of a normative commitment in the guise of a passive
exercise in mechanical jurisprudence.
1. Simultaneity and Contiguity
Neoformalist interpretation of contract language presumes that the
disclaimer and the alleged promise were uttered simultaneously by the
54. Res. Tech. Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972, 976-77 (Vyo. 1996)
(stating that as an alternative basis for the ruling the claim for promissory estoppel was
barred by parol evidence rule where integrated agreement contradicted written promises
made six days before execution of integration).
55. Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that
disavowal by estate of decedent's promise to pay off plaintiffs mortgage barred

promissory estoppel claim when plaintiff subsequently relied on promise by assuming
mortgage). See also McMahon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 162 F.3d 28, 39 (1st Cir. 1998)
(finding reliance to be unreasonable as a matter of law "[w]here a written statement
conflicts with an oral statement," because "Massachusetts law assumes that a reasonable
person will investigate further"); Coil v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1124

(lst Cir. 1995) (stating that when a promisee is faced with a conflict between an oral
promise and a written statement, it is unreasonable as a matter of law to rely on the oral
promise).

same author and were heard that way by the employee, even though the
disclaimer and the promise or representation were separated widely in
space, time, and circumstance. For example, the disclaimer may have
been expressed in an employee handbook that was reviewed along with
a stack of other forms in a personnel office. The promise may have been
made years later on a job site by a supervisor in a conversation about the
employee's performance. 6
Neoformalist contract interpretation
implicitly assumes that the disclaimer was present to the employee's
consciousness at all times after it was uttered. Courts convey the
simultaneity rhetorically by juxtaposing the two statements in close
proximity in the judicial opinion, where their inconsistency seems
obvious.
2. Nonrepeal
In ordinary speech, a later statement is usually understood to
supersede an earlier, inconsistent statement. Where the inconsistency is
obvious to both the speaker and the hearer, the hearer will usually not
demand that the speaker reconfirm the second statement, but will assume
that it represents the speaker's current position. Thus, if the speaker first
says, "I won't be making any appointments today," and later in the day
says, "I promise to join you for lunch," the hearer will assume the
speaker changed his mind about appointments. Neoformalist judges,
however, indulge in the opposite presumption. A disclaimer will not be
deemed to have been superseded by a subsequent statement of the sort
disclaimed.
3. Primacy of Disclaimerover Promise
In neoformalist interpretation, where a speaker utters both a promise
and a disclaimer in any seq9uence, the disclaimer always takes
precedence over the promise
This reverses the usual discourse
convention of ordinary speech, in which committal trump noncommittal
statements. Thus, when a promise is followed by a disclaimer, the
56. E.g., Hatfield v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 52 F.3d 858, 865 (10th Cir. 1995);
Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo. 1994); McIntosh v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 570, 571-72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (finding two years between
disclaimer and promise). See DeLong, supranote 11, at 975-76, 975 n. 109.
57. See DeLong, supra note 11, at 1007-08. Earlier research showed a judicial
tendency to overcome disclaimers when they are ambiguous. A review of cases during
the eleven-year period from 1980 to 1991 found forty-one cases that failed to enforce
handbook or job application disclaimers. Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and
the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUST. REL. L.J. 326, 382-85 (1991-1992). It is
likely that formal defects identified in such decisions have been repaired by later
employers.
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disclaimer repeals the promise.

When a promise is preceded or

accompanied by a disclaimer, the disclaimer nullifies the promise.
E. The Utility of Disclaimers
A realist approach to the disclaimer strategy is bottomed on the
commercial value of the mechanism. The disclaimer looks different to
the two parties. To the promisee, the disclaimer looks like an
incantation that permits the speaker to indulge in a carnival of lies and
contradictions without legal liability. It also seems to permit the speaker
to opt out of a tort-based standard of conduct and to gain the freedom to
abuse the trust and confidence that later develops as the parties continue
to deal with each other.
To the promisor, however, the disclaimer opens a space for informal
negotiation and speech in which the speaker can avoid being trapped
into unintentional legal commitment or being made responsible
for unbargained-for reliance. The employment handbook disclaimer
theoretically prevents misunderstandings about who has power to bind
the speaker and about what kinds of legal obligations the speaker is
willing to undertake. These effects reduce the costs associated with
legal risks, and so facilitate negotiation and the creation of useful
enforceable relationships. As Stanley Henderson observed, preservation
of this precontractual freedom to "express, or to refuse to express, a
willingness to be bound" is an objective of the rules of contract
formation, such as offer and acceptance. "s Disclaimers prevent reliance
principles from limiting this freedom.
Even after the conclusion of precontractual negotiations, disclaimers
operate to prevent legal obligation from arising within the course of an
Bernstein has shown that the
ongoing business relationship.
unenforceable promise is a common feature of mercantile life." She has
also suggested why rational merchants would desire significant parts of
their commercial relationships to consist of unenforceable obligations
Bernstein concluded that most
subject to nonlegal sanctions.'
relations governed by a dual set
business
have
their
to
merchants prefer
norms" and
"relationship-preserving
unenforceable
legally
of norms:
legally enforceable "end-game norms" to regulate the termination of the
58.
59.
60.

Henderson, supra note 15, at 357-58, 360.
Bernstein, MerclhatLaw, supra note 4, at 1808-09.
Id. at 1788-89.

relationship.6' She has made a persuasive argument that courts should
not enforce commitments that merchants do not obviously intend to
create legal obligations, and that doing so would have negative effects
62
on commerce.
Bernstein's analysis is, however, derived primarily from merchant
trade associations in which most parties can be assumed to understand
which commitments are legally enforceable and which are not. 3
Extending the principle of unenforceable obligation to relationships
between merchants and nonmerchants requires more justification. The
unenforceable promise is problematic when made to someone-an
employee, a consumer, an insured-who does not understand the effect
of the disclaimer.' For example, Pauline Kim's research has shown that
employees persistently believe that they can be terminated only for cause
despite being informed in employee handbooks and otherwise that they
are at-will. Others have found that employees may feel that they have a
"psychological contract" depending on its use of certain kinds of
language.
Bernstein theorizes that, like merchant buyers, consumer buyers may
prefer to rely on unenforceable "relationship-preserving norms" instead
of enforceable "end-game norms," but for different reasons.67 Legal
enforceability may have little value to a consumer. In the absence of
personal injury, the amount in controversy for breach of a consumer
contract generally does not justify the expense of legal redress even
when entitlement is clear. Under these circumstances, most consumers
must rely on unenforceable norms. It would be irrational for them to pay
an increased product price in order to obtain enforceable rights.6 Todd
Rakoff has also suggested that consumers commonly rely on the sellers'
reputation to fulfill obligations that are legally disclaimed in the
standardized form contracts. 9
61. Id. at 1796.
62. Id. at 1794-95. See also Symposium, supra note 4. Other theorists have
questioned the wisdom or efficiency of legal enforcement of commercial customs, even
assuming they could be proved with sufficient certainty. POSNER, supra note 10, at 15661.
63. Bernstein, MerchantLaw, supra note 4, at 1769-79.
64. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptionsof Legal Protectionin an At-Will World, 83 CORNELl. L. REv. 105, 133-46

(1997).
65. Id.
66. Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks, Contract Formation and
Employee Handbooks:Legal, Psychological,and EmpiricalAnalyses, 29 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 647, 676-77 (1994).
67. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra 4, at 1790-91 (referring to "shrink-wrap"
warranty disclaimers in computer software).
68. Id.
69. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
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H. NEO-REALIST CHANNEL CHANGING, OR "WHAT IS
THE SCOLDING OF THAT CASE?"
It is a curious rhetorical feature of opinions that deal with claims of
contract and related forms of obligation that the courts frequently
interrupt their rulings to scold the losing party for behaving imprudently
or incautiously. 70 Typical chiding messages are, "Don't blame us; you
should have protected yourself'; "You were imprudent to trust your
adversary"; "You should have gotten his promise in writing"; "It was
foolish for you to sign without reading the document"; and "If that's
what you meant, you should have expressed it in the contract." This
pedagogical note is absent from the typical opinion in other common law
or statutory fields and suggests that contract opinions are intended not
only to justify the decision but to educate the litigants.
Like their predecessors, some of the new formalist courts have been
quick to seize any opportunity to chastise losing parties for failing to
read agreements before signing or failing to get critical promises in
writing. If anything is new about these decisions, it is a more candid
admission that the court will deny recovery solely to steer parties into
formalist channels when creating an obligation for reasons that have
more to do with judicial economy than with the doctrinal requirements
of reliance-protecting rules. The effect of this steering is that the
doctrines of misrepresentation and promissory estoppel are deforming in
ways that will make them less available to commercial parties. This is
classic realism.
In Thatcher's Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated
Supermarkets, Inc.,71 Thatcher, a pharmacy, was considering a renewal
of its lease on space in a shopping center.' The lease contained a
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226-29 (1983).
70. Examples could be multiplied endlessly. Some classics include James Baird
Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 345-46 (2d Cir. 1933) (finding that the
subcontractor could have, but did not, require acceptance of its offer by general

contractor); Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448, 451 (1874) (justifying requiring
enforcement of contracts in harsh cases because the promisor "has improvidently
assumed an absolute, when he might have undertaken only a qualified, liability"); Jacob
& Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (stating that the owner could have
secured the right to perfect performance "by apt and certain words"); Peev'house v.
GarlandCoal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1963) (finding that the owner
should have specifically negotiated for defendant's undertaking to restore strip mined
property).

71. 636 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1994).
at 157.
72. Id.

promise by the landlord not to lease to another pharmacy, but excepted a
supermarket also located in the shopping center." Concerned about
potential competition from the supermarket, Thatcher prepared to
relocate. But when the landlord and the supermarket each orally assured
Thatcher that the supermarket would not open a competing pharmacy, 4
Thatcher renewed its lease for 10 years. The supermarket later made
plans to open a pharmacy and Thatcher sued to enjoin the opening."
The trial court entered the injunction on a theory of promissory
estoppel.76 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on the basis that
enforcement of the promise was not necessary to avoid injustice.77 First,
the court found Thatcher's reliance on the supermarket's oral promise to
have been unreasonable.78 The language of the lease agreement reserved
the supermarket's right to operate a pharmacy, and Thatcher had a
history of "less than amicable" relations with the supermarket. 9
In view of the relationship between the parties and the nature and duration
of the promise, any agreement not to compete should have been formalized.
Proceeding in such a manner would have memorialized the occasion and
reduced the possibility that the terms of the agreement would be misunderstood.
As a business entity operating in the commercial setting, Thatcher's showed
poor judgment when it decided to renew its ten-year lease and forgo its
opportunity to relocate on the basis of an indefinitely worded promise uttered in
an informal conversation with a potential competitor.80

The court also based its decision on the informality with which the
promise was made." Finally, the court held that the absence of a written
agreement "prevented critical evidentiary, cautionary, and deterrent
functions from being performed."82 Thus, the court held that because the
73. Id.
74. Id. at 159-60.
75. Id. at 157.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 161.
78. Id. at 160.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 160-61.
81. The court stated:
[The oral promise] fails to reflect the degree of formality one would expect
when business rivals operating in a commercial setting have rights at stake as
important as the freedom to enter a new line of business and the choice of
where to locate for a ten-year period of time. Despite the gravity of these
matters, the record fails to reveal that the parties even so much as shook hands
to formalize their agreement.
Id. at 161.
82. Id. The court quoted the following passage from the Restatement (Second):
[S]atisfaction of [this] requirement may depend on the reasonableness of the
promisee's reliance, on its definite and substantial character in relation to the
remedy sought, on the formality with which the promise is made, on the extent
to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling functions of
form are met by the commercial setting or otherwise, and on the extent to
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formalities of an express contract were missing, enforcement of the oral

promise was not necessary to prevent injustice. While the majority
emphasized Thatcher's lack of enforcement reliance, however, the

dissenting opinion emphasized the reasonableness of its performance
reliance in light of the promisor's history of performing its promises.'

Thatcher exemplifies the scolding tone of the new formalism in the
courts. The court complains that the plaintiff was too trusting and used
"poor judgment" in relying on the oral assurances of a rival. The
Thatcher court sends a message: failing to formalize an important

business agreement may alone be sufficient reason to deny reliance
protection.'
Courts practicing the new formalism in contract law often express an
intention to steer commercial actors into the path of express contracts
and away from relations whose obligations are defined by tort law, such
as misrepresentation. In Lazard Freres & Co. v. Protective Life
Insurance Co.,8 an institutional seller sued a sophisticated buyer for

breach of a contract to purchase $10 million in bank debt.t The contract
had been made by telephone, then confirmed in writing several days
later subject to preparation of final documentation and closing." Buyer
refused to negotiate and execute the final closing documents."
which such other policies as the enforcement of bargains and the prevention of
unjust enrichment are relevant.
Id. at 160 (quoting RESTATmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b).
83. Justice Papadakos, in his dissent, stated:
The trial court also found that Mr. Zukin [Thatcher] knew from his prior
dealings that Mr. Greenblatt [the supermarket] had previously (in 1976)
honored his promise to stop plans to open a pharmacy if Thatcher would not
sell milk by removing signs announcing the opening of a pharmacy; and that
Mr. Zukin knew, based on his knowledge of the supermarket layout and the
terms of its lease, that the supermarket was at or near its maximum level of
available selling space for non-food items. Under these circumstances, it was
reasonable for Thatcher to believe that Consolidated would honor its oral
promise not to compete and to act in reliance thereon.
Id. at 164 (Papadakos, J., dissenting).
84. Thatcher was applied to an oral employment agreement in Marner v. Saloom
Furniture Co., Inc., No. 94-6869, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13733, at *19-21 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 12, 1995). The court held that a commission sales agent's reliance on an oral
promise of five-year employment was unreasonable where he did not get the promise in
writing and did not "confirm" its terms, the promise was made in a relatively informal
meeting, no hands were shaken, and five-year contracts were rare. Id.
85. 108 F.3d 1531 (2d Cir. 1997).
86. Id. at 1534.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1535.

Buyer raised an affirmative defense of fraud, alleging that in the
original conversation, seller orally misrepresented the dates on which the
issuer of the debt was certain to pay it. After the buyer orally agreed to
purchase the debt, the seller sent the buyer a written confirmation and a
copy of a report that contradicted the oral representation and gave the
actual repayment dates.' Without reading the report, the buyer signed
the confirmation.9 When it later learned the truth, it refused to perform
by executing the final contractual agreement.9
The district court granted summary judgment to the seller on grounds
that the buyer was not justified in relying on the seller's oral
characterization of the contents of the report that the buyer had in its
possession.93 The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Calabresi,
refused to affirm on this ground, however, because of evidence that the
parties considered themselves to have been legally bound by the
telephone conversation, before the buyer received the report.' Thus,
whether the buyer's reliance on the oral representation was justifiable
was to be determined as of that earlier date. Citing the need for speedy
acceptance of the seller's offer, the appellate court was unwilling to hold
that reliance on oral representations in such a large transaction was
unjustifiable as a matter of law merely because the parties were both
sophisticated."
However, both the oral and written agreements contained a customary
term conditioning closing upon the preparation, review, and execution of
documentation acceptable to both Lazard and Protective prior to
closing. 96 The Court of Appeals held that if the buyer failed to condition
its duty to close on the truthfulness of the seller's representations, its
reliance on those representations could not support a fraud claim.' The
court declared, "We believe that the failure to insert such language into
the contract-by itself-renders reliance on the misrepresentation
unreasonable as a matter of law." 98 Thus the court held that Protective
either: (1) did not breach the contract because a condition precedent to
closing failed to occur, namely, the truthfulness of seller's oral
representations; or (2) breached because it had an unconditional duty to
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1534.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1534-35.
93. Id. at 1535.
94. Id. at 1542-43.
95. Id. at 1543.
96. Id. at 1534.
97. Id.at 1543.
98. Id. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the oral
contract did in fact contain such a condition precedent. Id. at 1545.
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close and had no excuse of fraudulent inducement.9

This holding can be given either a narrow or a broad construction. It
may mean only that if a party has reserved a right to approve documents

prior to closing, then failure to condition closing on the truthfulness of
pretrial representations renders its reliance on those representations

unreasonable. It might also mean that when a party enters a contract
relying on an oral representation because he does not have time to obtain

a written warranty, he must reserve the right not to close if the
representation proves false. More broadly construed, Lazard Freres

forecloses merchants from claims based on oral misrepresentations
whenever they could have conditioned their liability or loss on
contractual requirements that the representations be true. This rule
would restrict the operation of the law of misrepresentation in

commercial transactions to those rare circumstances in which transaction
costs prevented the parties from creating contractual conditions relating
to the truth of the representations.
An even more candid acknowledgment of the new realism is apparent
° All-Tech sued Amway,
in All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp.'0
claiming that its misrepresentations induced All-Tech to engage in a
business that failed. In disposing of this claim, Judge Posner observed

that the economic-loss doctrine confines contract parties to contract
remedies in cases involving product warranties:

99. Id. at 1543-45. The court stated:
As a substantial and sophisticated player in the bank debt market, Protective
was under a further duty to protect itself from misrepresentation. It could
easily have done so by insisting on an examination of the Scheme Report as a
condition of closing. "[Wihere, as here, a party has been put on notice of the
existence of material facts which have not been documented and he
nevertheless proceeds with a transaction without securing the available
documentation or inserting appropriatelanguage in the agreement for his
protection, he may truly be said to have willingly assumed the business risk
that the facts may not be as represented. Succinctly put, a party will not be
heard to complain that he has been defrauded when it is his own evident lack
of due care which is responsible for his predicament." We believe that the
failure to insert such language into the contract-by itself-renders reliance on
the misrepresentation unreasonable as a matter of law. This, however, does not
resolve the case. For Protective does, in effect, claim that it inserted just such
appropriate language into the agreement.
Id. at 1543 (quoting Rodas v. Manitaras, 552 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (emphasis added))
(internal citations omitted).
100. 174 F.3d. 862 (7th Cir. 1999).

If the seller makes an oral representation that is important to the buyer, the latter
has only to insist that the seller embody that representation in a written
warranty. The warranty will protect the buyer, who will have an adequate
remedy under the Uniform Commercial Code if the seller reneges. To allow
him to use tort law in effect to enforce an oral warranty would unsettle contracts
by exposing sellers to the risk of being held liable by a jury on the basis of selfinterested oral testimony and perhaps made to pay punitive as well as
compensatory damages. This menace is averted by channeling disputes into
warranty (contract) law, where oral warranties can be expressly disclaimed, or
extinguished by operation of the parol evidence rule.10'

While some observers would see it as an example of "neoformalist"
hostility to reliance protection, All-Tech is an exercise in pure, policydriven legal realism. Refusing to engage in mechanical enforcement of

misrepresentation doctrine (for example, "Was there a misrepresentation

of material fact? Did it induce reliance?"), the court instead adopts the

perspective of the merchant seller to whom reliance protection is a "risk
of being held liable by a jury." To protect the seller, the court
"channels" the dispute (and future similar disputes) into contract law.
There they can be controlled by textual devices such as warranty
disclaimers and the parol evidence rule. In contrast to the solicitude for
the seller, the court's attitude to the buyer is hostile, critical of the
buyer's failure to get its promise in writing, and skeptical of the buyer's
honesty in premising a claim on "self-interested oral testimony.
Posner makes the case for textual formalism in the service to realist
(albeit non-progressive) policy objectives.
Whether one chooses to classify decisions such as Thatcher, Lazard
Freres,and All-Tech as examples of neoformalist textualism or as realist
efforts to reshape commercial behavior, the trend they portend is clear:

courts will give no protection to reliance on an informal promise unless
the promisee can demonstrate a good reason for having failed to
memorialize the promise in an express contract. Aside from rare deals
101. Id. at 866. See also Neibarger v. Universal Coop., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 618
(Mich. 1992).
[W]here a plaintiff seeks to recover for economic loss caused by a defective
product purchased for commercial purposes, the exclusive remedy is provided
by the UCC, including its statute of limitations.
...Where damage to other property was caused by the failure of a product
purchased for commercial purposes to perform as expected, and this damage
was within the contemplation of the parties to the agreement, the occurrence of
such damage could have been the subject of negotiations between the parties.
Id. at 618-20.
102. The rhetorical overkill in this phrase reveals the court's commitment to
traditional formalist virtues. All testimony is oral. By drawing attention to the orality of
testimony, Posner's intentional redundancy implies that speech is inferior to writing. He
also suggests (1) that all witnesses to oral promises will be parties interested in the
transaction, and (2) that juries cannot evaluate the effects of self-interest on credibility.
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made under emergency conditions,'t0 that burden will be impossible to
discharge.
IV. THE REALIST ANALYSIS OF RELIANCE
Lon Fuller began The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages with
these observations:
In the assessment of damages the law tends to be conceived, not as a purposive
ordering of human affairs, but as a kind of juristic mensuration. The language
of the decisions sounds in terms not of command but of discovery....
It is, as a matter of a fact, clear that the things which the law of damages
purports to "measure" and "determine"--the "injuries", items of damage".
"causal connections", etc.---are in considerable part its own creations, and that
the process of "measuring" and "determining" them is really a part of the
process of creating them.... In actuality the loss which the plaintiff suffers
(deprivation of the expectancy) is not a datum of nature but the reflection of a
normative order. It appears as a "loss" only by reference to an unstated
ought.1°4

Years

before

"social

constructivism' ' 0

became

intellectually

respectable, Fuller's straightforward prose captured its essential
1 6 - Even when exercising what appears to be a factual inquiry,
insight.
103. These emergency conditions include the now well-established application of
estoppel to subcontractors' bids that are used in a general contractor's bid, under which
the general contractor is deemed to have an option contract for a reasonable time to
accept the subcontractor's bid because of the logistical difficulty of creating an express
contract under the circumstances of the bid process. Architectural Metal Sys. v.
Consolidated Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 1227 (7th Cir. 1995); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333
P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). For an explanation of the exigencies of the bid process, see
Holman Erection Co. v. Orville E. Madsen & Sons, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 1983).
104. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages:1, 46 YALE L.J. 52,52-53 (1936).
105. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1160-70 (1985). For a description of social constructivist theory and its influence on the
social sciences, see Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the
Legal Order: The Casefor Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L REV. 1083, 108590 (1991). See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKIANN, THE SOcIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966);
STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 1-17,338-55 (1980).
106. Fuller's point had been made much earlier by several Realists, beginning with
the Ur-Realist Holmes' famous observation that "[b]ehind the logical form lies a
judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of
the whole proceeding." O.A. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L REV. 457,466
(1897). Felix Cohen's sustained attack on the naturalness of legal categories also made
the point. Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935).

the court in making its "findings" and "determinations" will be engaged
' It was this insight that led
in "a purposive ordering of human affairs."'O
the realists and later the critical legal studies scholars to deny the very
possibility of the formalist claim to apply authoritative rules objectively
to objective facts about human affairs. Inevitable moments of judgment
and value occur in the labeling process of rule application. Even in the
purely factual part of formalist adjudication of a promissory estoppel
claim-in the determination of whether a promise induced reliance-we
find a normative order.
The text of section 90 requires that a promise induce actual reliance
before enforcement will be appropriate.' A promisee's actual reliance

on a promise is an almost universal prerequisite to liability under section
90. Despite the formalist requirement of a promise, the reliance
requirement preserves the realist half of section 90's dual nature.
A. "Real" Reliance
As Fuller argued, ostensibly objective "causal connections""° are

Legal concepts (for example, corporation or property rights) are supernatural
entities which do not have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith.
Rules of law, which refer to these legal concepts, are not descriptions of
empirical social facts... nor yet statements of moral ideals, but are rather
theorems in an independent system.
Id. at 821. Fuller also repeated Cohen's warning:
When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence are thought
of as reasons for decisions.., then the author, as well as the reader, of the
opinion or argument, is apt to forget the social forces which mold the law and
the social ideals by which the law is to be judged.
Id. at 812. See also Peller, supra note 105, at 1228.
107. E.g., Peller, supra note 105, at 1182-83 (stating that conventional terms of
legal discourse such as "loss" purport to reflect "positive content, independent of the
terms themselves"). This is not to suggest that the court must create the social construct
anew with each ruling. The court experiences the construct as reified. Id. at 1157
("Reification refers to the process by which social reality is experienced as fixed or
objective.").
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
§ 90. Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance.
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearanceis binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.
Id. § 90(1) (emphasis added).
109. H.L.A. HART& TONY HONORI , CAUSATION INTHE LAW 60 (2d ed. 1985).
[W]hen causal language is used of the provision or failure to provide another
with an opportunity, it is implied that this is a deviation from a standard
practice or expected procedure; the notions of what is unusual and what is
reprehensible by accepted standards both influence the use of causal language
in such cases.
Id.
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among the creations of law even though they may seem more nearly a
datum of nature. If Fuller was correct, we might expect a court's

determinations of causation to be culturally contingent rather than
objectively inevitable.
The interesting feature of section 90
jurisprudence is that the normative elements of the court's findings do
not usually appear where one would expect them to in applying the
normative elements of the rule, but in the ostensibly objective causal
determination mandated by the reliance requirement.

Especially as it appears in the Restatement (Second), section 90
contains an explicit reference to normative considerations because it
limits enforcement to those situations in which "injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise," and provides that the remedy for
breach "may be limited as justice requires.""
One would expect
contemporary courts to defer their policy and normative-based
arguments to the point in their analysis when they reach this element."'

Instead, most courts adjudicate the reasonableness and propriety of the
parties' behavior when determining whether a promise was made,
whether it induced reliance, and whether the reliance was foreseeable.

Before they reach the last element-injustice-most plaintiffs have
already been eliminated by more objective-sounding criteria."'
One of the elements that serves to reduce litigation is "inducement."

Recent opinions applying the reliance requirement to promissory
110. RESTATEiENT (SECOND) oF CONTRACTS § 90(1981).
111. Whether enforcement is necessary to prevent injustice is "a legal question for
the court, as it involves a policy decision." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d
387, 391 (Minn. 1992). See Henderson, supra note 15, at 383 (finding that the injustice
requirement gives courts "wide latitude in redistributing losses resulting from unfilled
promises"). Id. at 386 (cautioning against equating reliance with the formal detriment
that would constitute consideration).
112. Nevertheless, if all else fails the "injustice" requirement is an opn invitation
for the court to criticize the plaintiff's behavior from a number of perspec ves. Holmes
v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 180 F.3d 294, 296, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim for
promissory estoppel by defendant who took possession of wrecked car and disposed of
it, preventing plaintiff from using the car to prove a products liability claim, and finding
that plaintiff was "unreasonably dilatory" by failing to inspect the car despite having a
reasonable opportunity to do so, and that promissory estoppel "requires the promisee to
have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise"); McCann v. Jackson, 429
P.2d 265, 266 (Colo. 1967) (stating that because promissory estoppel is an equitable
remedy, relief will be denied if the plaintiff does not come into court with "clean
hands"); Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391 (deciding whether refusal to enforce promise of
confidentiality would result in injustice by reference to moral principles). Henderson
criticized the use of such equitable doctrines as going beyond the proper elements of a
section 90 claim. Henderson, supra note 15, at 379.

estoppel claims have required plaintiff to prove the existence of a strict
cause-in-fact relationship between the promise and the reliance-action.
A description of this doctrinal element necessitates a brief discussion of
the meaning of reliance as a form of behavior. The reliance behavior
that the law of contracts concerns is reliance on a "promise."" 3 To rely

on a promise, a promisee"' must: (1) believe that a promisor has made a
commitment to the promisee to perform as stated; ' (2) believe that if
the promisor performs and if the promisee takes a particular course of
action (the reliance action), then the promisee will be made better off
than if the promisee fails to take the reliance action;"6 (3) believe that the
promisor will perform as promised; and (4) take the reliance action
"because of' belief (1), (2), and (3).
The last element of reliance contains a causal term that is doubly
problematic. First, as the quotation from Fuller recognized, the legal
idea of physical cause-in-fact is a moral and political concept rather than
a scientific one. ' 7 From among all the necessary sine qua non
conditions of an event, a court will select those that will be designated as

its "causes."

The selection reflects a normative order rather than a

113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) ("A promise is a
manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to
justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.").
114. Section 90 also protects reliance by a non-promisee, but that rule will not be
discussed here. Id. § 90(1). Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing Unilateral Contracts:
The Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 28 (1992).
115. HART & HONORt, supra note 109, at 53-54 (stating the uptake conditions for
inducement).
116. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 701 (1986) ("Reliance refers to investments that
will be profitable to the promisee only if performance occurs."); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examinationof the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE
L.J. 1261, 1267 (1980) (distinguishing "detrimental reliance," defined as the difference
to the promisee in utility between non-reliance and reliance on a promise that is
breached, from "beneficial reliance," referring to the gain the promisee obtains from
relying on a kept promise). The promisee may also believe that if the promisee takes the
reliance action and the promisor does not perform, then the promisee will be worse off
than if she had not taken the reliance action. Id. DeLong, supra note 11, at 952-53.
This makes reliance a gamble on the promisor's performance. But this second belief is
not essential to the existence of reliance.
117. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 104, at 52-53. The distinction between the
causation of classical physics and legal causation is an oft-made point. On the Realists'
attack on legal causation, see MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 51-63 (1992). Both legal and nonlegal conceptions of causation select from among all the "but-for" conditions of the
event only those that are deemed in some way significant. HART & HONORI, supra note
109, at 108-11. Similarly, by "framing" a defendant's action to include only certain of
its but-for conditions, the criminal law preserves the liberal view of free choice as a basis
for blame and punishment. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 88-96
(1987); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981).
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neutral or objective description.
Second, the application of the concept of causation to circumstances in
which persons act on the basis of reasons is additionally problematic." '
Describing the reasons for a conscious agent's intentional behavior as its
"cause" requires a departure from the simple, sine qua non concept of
physical causation. We do not say that an offer was the "cause" of an
acceptance,1 9 even though we would admit that "but-for" the offer, the
acceptance would not have occurred. Instead, we say that the offer was
a "reason"f for the acceptance, meaning that while the offer was
significant to the offeree's response, it did not alone determine that
response: the offeree might have rejected the offer.'" This way of
speaking not only expresses the distinction between necessary and
sufficient conditions, but also implies that voluntary human choice (the
offeree's choice to accept) breaks the causal chain for some legal
purposes. The presumption of voluntary human response complicates
simplistic "but-for" causation.
Section 90 does not by its language specify whether promises are to be
viewed as "causes" or as "reasons." It requires that the promise
"induce" the reliance action. The active agent in the sentence is the
promise, not the promisee, who is, if anything, acted upon by the
promise. The use of "induce" suggests something more nearly causal
than that the promise be a reason for the reliance action. How much
more is unclear and so is left open to judicial manipulation.
In addition to the looseness of the concept of "inducement," section 90
contains two other avenues for the introduction of normative elements
into the realist analysis of reliance. The most important is that the
promisor must have reason to expect the promisee to rely on the promise
at the time it was made. The requirement that inducement of the
promisee's actual postpromise behavior be foreseeable permits the court
118. DeLong, supra note 11, at 952-53. Cf. Jay Conison, Assurance. Reliance, and
Expectation, 6 S. CAL. INTamRsc. L.J. 335, 335-38 (1998) (drawing a distinction
between reliance and acting on a belief).
119. HART & HONomR
supra note 109, at 51-57 (stating that causation of
intentional action does not mean that the reliance action was an inevitable consequence
of the promise, only that it constituted a reason rendering the proposed action more
"eligible" and that the action would not have been taken in the absence of the promise).
See JOHN K. SEARLE, INTENTIONALTY: AN ESSAY INTHE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 117-24
(1983).
120. HART & HONORA , supra note 109, at 54 (finding that statements induce
reliance by rendering the reliance action "more eligible" than it would be in the absence
of the statement).

to evaluate the degree of rational relationship of the promise to the
promisee's decision to rely.'
Foreseeability also demands that this
relationship be apparent to a person in the position of the promisor at the
time of the promise.
B. Realist Analysis of Reliance
After the court has determined the existence of a formal promise and
the plaintiff has proved that she acted or refrained from acting in some
way after the promise was made, the court must determine whether the
promise "induced" the action or forbearance. In making this finding, the
court applies both an individualized cause-in-fact requirement and a
"reasonable person" standard of causation. Plaintiff fails if she cannot
satisfy both requirements. Recent decisions illustrate the ways in which
policy or normative reasoning in the guise of strict cause-in-fact
reasoning has been used to bar promissory estoppel claims by courts as
they determine whether the promise actually "induced" the reliance.
The individualized standard requires the reliance act to be induced in
the sense of being caused in fact by the promise. The promise must
actually induce this person to act. In making this determination, courts
employ implicit normative standards in the guise of purely causal
reasoning.
1. Reliance That OccursAfter a Promise Is Withdrawn
A clear example of a court making a choice about what will "count" as
causal inducement occurs in cases in which the promisor withdraws the
promise or otherwise states that it will not perform before the promisee
takes the reliance action.'" Courts refuse to find that reliance action
taken after such a disavowal was induced by the original promise. The
decision not to consider such reliance as having been induced by the
promise does not proceed from simple "but-for" causal reasoning but
121. The idea of reliance is limited to actions that are rationally related to beliefs
according to common understanding. HART & HONORI, supra note 109, at 57; Conison,
supra note 118, at 335-38. As Jay Feinman noted, foreseeability is as much of a
normative concept in contract law as it is in tort law. Feinman, supra note 13, at 715
(stating that a determination that the promisor had reason to know that promisee might
rely involves "an application of the court's own views of the proper norms of
commercial conduct").
122. Variety Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Century Med. Health Plan, Inc., 57 F.3d
1040, 1042-43 (11 th Cir. 1995) (finding that promisor withdrew promise to pay for
treatment before treatment was given); Properties Dev., Inc. v. Sto-Kent Lanes, Inc., No.
17059, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2169, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 24, 1995) (finding that
promisor revoked oral promise to contribute to cost of constructing road before plaintiff
relied).
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from a normative evaluation of the reasonableness of the promisee's
behavior and the policies favoring enforcement.
However, there is nothing intrinsic to the cultural or social idea of a
promise that would make it subject to repudiation at the promisor's
option."
It depends on what is understood about the degree of
commitment of the promise. "Un-promising" is not a common cultural
construct. Nevertheless, as a matter of policy courts seem unwilling to
disentangle the effects of disappointed reliance in cases in which the
promisee had some warning that performance might not be forthcoming.
In such cases, "real" reliance may become irrelevant.
2. Reliance That May Be Caused by Something
Other Than the Promise
The problems of joint, additional, or multiple causation have always
presented a policy choice to the judicial system. Consider a typical case:
A and B simultaneously shoot at C and each bullet strikes a vital organ.

C dies immediately. A's act of shooting was not a "but-for" cause of C's
death. C would have died anyway from B's gunshot. By the same
reasoning, however, B's act of shooting was not a but-for cause of C's
death. C would have died anyway from A's shooting. A court
concerned with a rule that requires it to determine whether A's act was
the legal cause of C's death must choose whether to "ascribe" causation
to A's action and this choice will reflect a normative order. Thus, courts
are typically unwilling to say that neither of two independent causes of
an event is a legal cause if each of them is generated by a "wrongdoer."
As Fuller said, courts speak the language of discovery as they create that
which they purport to find.'24
Most courts have elected to exonerate a promisor if the promisee's
reliance action could be said to have been caused by an independent,
additional cause. Even though a promise would have been sufficient to
induce a reasonable person to rely exactly as did the plaintiff, plaintiff
loses if her individual circumstance provided a separate cause for her
action. Thus in Martin v. Huntington National Bank, " an employee
123. E.g., Tiersma, supra note 114, at 28 ("The promise is an unconditional act of
commitment that goes into effect immediately and therefore cannot be freely revoked.").
124. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 104, at 52.
125. No. L-95-077, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5051 (Ohio C. App. Nov. 17, 1995).
See also Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130, 1138 (Alaska 1996)
(finding that plaintiff had already disclosed his idea to defendant at the time of the

alleged reliance on an employer's alleged promise of a job in a different
city by moving to accept the job offer.'26 The court held that the
evidence demonstrated that the employee had already formed the
intention to relocate before receiving the job offer and so the moving
could not constitute reliance on the promise.'27 It did not consider that
the job offer might have constituted an independent cause of the move if
it had been sufficient itself to induce the reliance.
The individualized cause-in-fact requirement thus can be used to block
enforcement of a promise that would have been adequate to induce
reliance in a reasonable person. A typical way is to show that the
plaintiff had no other alternative to the reliance action. Thus, in Moore
v. FordMotor Co.,2' a promisee sued for breach of an oral agreement to
give the promisee an automobile dealership.'29 His claimed detrimental
reliance was forbearance to obtain a dealership from another source."
The court held that he could not succeed under section 90 unless he was
able to show that he would have3 in fact qualified for and obtained a firm
offer from the other dealership.1 '
Individualized cause-in-fact can also prevent a plaintiff from proving
that the reliance action was harmful even in cases in which it might be
presumed harmful to a reasonable person. Courts have also held that if
the harm a promisee suffers by acting in reliance on the promise would
have occurred in any case, the necessary reliance has not been shown.2
For example, in Mass Cash Register, Inc. v. Comtrex Systems Corp.,1
during negotiations, defendant acquired information about plaintiff's
accounts by promising not to use the information. Defendant then
breached the promise and began selling directly to plaintiffs main
account. The court held that detrimental reliance was not established on
these facts because the record also demonstrated that plaintiff would
have lost the account
in any event because it was unable to serve the
33
customer's needs.1

promise of employment); Rothman v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, No. CV-44-99-14, 1995
Conn. Super. LEXIS 518, at *8-9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1995) (finding that plaintiff
admitted that he had planned to move before receiving job offer).
126. Martin, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5051, at *8.
127. Id.
128. 901 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1995). This case was also discussed in DeLong,
supra note 11, at 998-99.
129. Moore, 901 F. Supp. at 1301.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Mass Cash Register, Inc. v. Comtrex Sys. Corp., 901 F. Supp. 404 (D. Mass.
1995).
133. Id. at 410-414, 419-420.
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3. Reliance That Consistedof the Performanceof a Legal Duty
Even if the plaintiff demonstrates that the promise was a "but-for"
cause or reason for his reliance, he will be unsuccessful if the reliance
action was the performance of a duty under an existing contract, statute,
or regulation. A typical case involves a promise given by one party to
another who is already bound under an existing contract with the
promisor. At common law, the pre-existing duty rule typically renders
such promises unenforceable as bargain contracts on the basis that
performance of the duty does not constitute fresh consideration for the
promise.M By contrast, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
permits enforcement of contract modifications without fresh
consideration so long as the promisee is acting in good faith.'"'
Several courts have refused to enforce promises under section 90 on
the basis that the reliance action was the performance of a duty already
owed to the promisor, thereby importing the bargain-contract limitation
into the law of estoppel.' 3' For example, in FDIC v. Patel," the drawer
of a letter of credit sought to avoid payment on the grounds that it had
posted the letter in reliance on the beneficiary's promise not to draw on
it. The court held that the drawer's posting could not amount to reliance
because it was under a pre-existing contractual duty to post the letter."
In Tractor & Farm Supply, Inc. v. FordNew Holland, Inc.,' t" the court
denied a promissory estoppel claim on grounds, in part, that the
promisee/dealer's performance of duties under an existing dealership
contract could not constitute reliance on the manufacturer's
postcontractual promises.'
In such cases, the courts do not consider whether the promisee might
have breached its pre-existing obligation in the absence of the promise.
Individualized cause-in-fact seems not to be the issue. The decision to
deny the reality of reliance in such cases may reflect a normative
decision not to give cognizance to the "right" to violate a legal duty. It
134. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) oFCONTRACTS § 73 (1981).
135. U.C.C. § 2-209 (1989).
136. E.g., Cambridgeport Savings Bank v. Boersner, 597 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (Mass.
1992) (finding that guarantors' alleged reliance on bank's promise to fund loan interest

payments in incurring expense and marketing condominiums was performance of
contractual duty and so was not induced by the bank's promise).
137. 46 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 1995).

138. Id. at 486-87.
139.

898 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Ky. 1995).

140. Id. at 1205.

may also be a holdover from the pre-existing duty rule in the
consideration doctrine or it may result from a judgment that enforcement
of the promise in such cases is not necessary to avoid injustice. In any
case, the reliance determination is a policy-driven exercise in the
construction of reality rather than a discovery of mute fact about the
world.
V. REFORTIFYING THE CITADEL: STATUTORY

BARRIERS TO SECTION 90
The counterattack on section 90 liability is not limited to the
proliferation of marketplace disclaimers and the development of a
judicial obstacle course. To the class of potential defendants, the
success of the disclaimer strategy depends both on meticulous
documentation of negotiation practices and on having the right judges in
place to hear the cases that arise). 4 ' More lasting advantage lies in
procuring the enactment of statutes in derogation of the common law
source of promissory estoppel. The defendant classes have thus turned
their attention to obtaining legislative barriers to section 90. To date, the
most successful of these have been Credit Agreement Acts (CAA).
Before the CAA, the following scenario was common: 42 Lender and
borrower (let us say, Farmer) have had a long financial relationship.
Farmer has a large secured loan from Bank that is by its terms callable at
the end of each year. To date, the loan has been refinanced annually
with the accrued interest being added to the unpaid principle. At some
point, Farmer visits Lender's office and a discussion ensues about the
next crop season. Farmer is edgy: crop prices have plummeted, the farm
is a marginal operation, and selling out may be the only reasonable thing
to do. Lender's agent, a loan officer who has a long personal
relationship with Farmer, makes reassuring noises to Farmer, urging him
to apply for renewal of the loan and promising that it will be rolled-over.
Lulled by these reassurances, Farmer does not sell out but plows on.
Inevitably, Lender surprises Farmer by refusing to refinance the loan
and demanding payment. Farmer, left high and financially dry,
counterclaims under section 90 for the reliance damages induced by
reliance on Lender's assurances. Lender must defend itself before a jury
141.

See Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95
L. REV. 1717, 1718-19 (1982) ("The more focused and sustained methods of
legislation and regulation are apt to have more dramatic effects than does alteration of
common law rules and thus will attract the primary efforts of those trying to use the law
to promote their own interests.").
142. This scenario is based loosely on the facts in State Bank of Standish v. Curry,
500 N.W.2d 104, 107-111 (Mich. 1993) (finding that the Bank's promise of "support"
was sufficiently definite to support claim under theory of promissory estoppel).
HARV.
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of the ungrateful Farmer's peers. A number of these juries found for

Farmer, finding that Lender had induced foreseeable reliance on its
promise to renew the loan, and courts, finding that justice required0
enforcement of the promise, awarded damages in disturbing amounts.'
"Lender liability" became a much dreaded phrase.

Lenders in several states thus secured enactment of CAAs. Although
they take several forms, most of them by their terms bar judicial
enforcement of any unsigned loan commitment promise under any
theory of obligation.1" It is fair to call the CAA a "Super Statute of
Frauds" because it requires more than the traditional statute of frauds: all
material terms must be contained in the writing and it must be signed by

both parties, not just the party to be charged. 45 The CAAs in some states
support dismissal of lender liability claims based on promissory
estoppel.'" A common prerequisite to the lender's right to raise the
143.

See generally John L. Culhane Jr. & Dean C. Gramich, Lender Liability

Limitation Amendments to State Statutes of Frauds,45 Bus. LAW. 1779, 1779 (1990)

(discussing report of ABA Task Force containing Model Lender liability Limitation
Statute); Todd C. Pearson, Note, Limiting Lender Liability: 7he Trend Toward Written
Credit Agreement Stdtutes, 76 MiNN. L. REV. 295 (1991); Robert D. Rowe, Special
Project Note, Written Agreements in the Lender-Borrower Context: The Illusion of
Certainty,42 VAND. L. Rsv. 917 (1989).

144. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Thompson, 989 F.2d 942, 943-44 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding that CAA bars claims and defenses of debtor based on alleged oral
promise of creditor to forgive unpaid balance of loan); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
McLean, 938 F. Supp. 487, 492-93 (N.D. Il. 1996) (finding that defendants'
counterclaim and defense were barred by the credit agreement act); Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp. v. Donogh Homes, Inc., No. 93-C-5614, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17690, at *5-10
(N.D. 11. Dec. 15, 1993) (barring all claims and defenses related to an alleged oral
agreement to extend or modify existing Written credit agreements); Univex Int'l, Inc. v.
Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 902 P.2d 877, 879 (Colo. CL App. 1995) (finding that the Act
bars both promissory estoppel and fraud claims); First Nat'l Bank in Staunton v.
McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 138, 142 (111. App. CL 1994) (stating that the Act
bars all claims and defenses relying on an oral promise, whether sounding in contract or
tort); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell, 661 So.2d 1325, 1329-31 (La. 1995); Fleming
Irrigation, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 661 So.2d 1035 (La. C. App. 1995);
American Realty Trust, Inc. v. First Bank of Missouri, 902 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995); Pearson, supra note 143, at 296-97. Contra Werth v. Golden Plains Credit
Union, No. 94-1286-DES, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14640, at *17 (D. Kan. Sept. 19,
1995) (permitting claim of promissory estoppel in spite of statute of frauds); Vabash
Grain, Inc., v. Bank One, 713 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. CL App. 1999) (stating in dictum
that estoppel might overcome the CAA statute of frauds to prevent "the infliction of an
unjust and unconscionable injury and loss").
145. Consolidation Servs., Inc. v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n, 185 F.3d 817, 819-20 (7th
Cir. 1999).
146. Klein v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 655 N.E.2d 1211, 1212-13 (111. App. Ct.
1995) (stating that the legislative intention was to bar promissory estoppel claims in

statutory defense is that it gave the plaintiff written notice of the statute
in an approved form. The CAA has also barred actions premised on oral
promises of credit made by
7 nonfinancial institutions during negotiations
for loans or acquisitions.'
In sum, the new generation of statutes of frauds is directed specifically
at the equitable exceptions to the old statutes of frauds.'48 Just as the
realist/progressive principles such as bad faith and unconscionability
crystallized into consumer protection legislation and agency regulation,
the anti-progressive formalist principles also aspire to a status beyond
the reach of hostile judges. In light of the success of CAA, one can
anticipate efforts to secure such "Super Statutes of Frauds" in other
areas, such as employment, insurance, and franchise litigation, if
potential defendants can muster the necessary political power.
VI. CONCLUSION

The adjudication of promissory estoppel cases is thoroughly realist
even when it seems to be most formalist. Focus on the form of the
promise requires interpretive commitments that introduce normative
values. Giving effect to formal disclaimers of liability also requires
extensive interpretive efforts that implement underlying normative
commitments. Making factual findings about whether the promise
induced reliance also involves normative judgments about the quality of
the commercial actor's judgment.
Several courts have openly
announced an intention to channel commercial dealmaking into formal
contracts by refusing to protect reliance that occurs in its absence.
The pattern of interaction between rules and standards, formalism and
realism, and merchant and court emerging from the history of
promissory estoppel strongly resembles Rose's description of the
geologic evolution of law:
Even if the legal rules have moved toward mud, private bargainers often try to
install their own little crystalline systems through contractual waivers of
warranties or disclosure duties (for example, the "as is" or "no warranty" sale).
These private efforts in effect move things into the pattern of a circle, from
crystal to mud and back to crystal. And the circle turns once again when the
courts ban such waivers, as they sometimes do, and firmly
49 re-establish a rule of
mud-only to be followed by even more artful waivers.

lender liability cases).
147. Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 96 F.3d 216, 219-20, 225 (7th Cir. 1996)
(barring affirmative defense based on plaintiffs oral promise to invest in defendant's
firm).
148. See Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 143, at 1791.
149. Rose, supra note 2, at 582-83 (footnote omitted).
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Whatever the intentions of the drafters of section 90 may have been,
the doctrine of promissory estoppel has not led to a commercial world
structured by webs of nonbargain, promissory obligation. Instead wellcounseled commercial parties have learned the formalized incantations
necessary to disclaim legal liability. Having cast the magic spells, they
are free to promise and induce reliance to their hearts' content, shielded
from liability until they participate in the ritual of offer and acceptance.
Even the few unfortunates who forget the magic words may hope for
rescue by a neoformalist judge bent on punishing gullible promisees
who fail to get their deals in writing. Thus, the net effect of the "antiformalist" section 90 on the commercial world has been to create a
simple formalist hoop for promisors to jump through on the way to
bargain contract. If you listen closely, you can hear Grant Gilmore's
ironic chuckle.
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